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Abstract
We propose a multivariate extension of Yaari’s dual theory of choice under risk. We show that a decision
maker with a preference relation on multidimensional prospects that preserves first order stochastic dom-
inance and satisfies comonotonic independence behaves as if evaluating prospects using a weighted sum
of quantiles. Both the notions of quantiles and of comonotonicity are extended to the multivariate frame-
work using optimal transportation maps. Finally, risk averse decision makers are characterized within this
framework and their local utility functions are derived. Applications to the measurement of multi-attribute
inequality are also discussed.
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In his seminal paper [24], Menahem Yaari proposed a theory of choice under risk, which
he called “dual theory of choice,” where risky prospects are evaluated using a weighted sum
of quantiles. The resulting utility is less vulnerable to paradoxes such as Allais’ celebrated
paradox [1]. The main ingredients in Yaari’s representation are the preservation of first order
stochastic dominance and insensitivity to hedging of comonotonic prospects. Both properties
have strong normative and behavioral appeal once it is accepted that decision makers care only
about the distribution of risky prospects. The preservation of stochastic dominance is justified by
the fact that decision makers prefer risky prospects that yield higher values in all states of the
world, whereas comonotonicity captures the decision maker’s insensitivity to hedging comono-
tonic prospects, that is to say, the fact that the decision maker who is indifferent between two
prospects that yield their higher and lower returns in the same states of the world, is also in-
different between any convex combination of those prospects. The dual theory has been used
extensively as an alternative to expected utility in a large number of contexts. The main draw-
back of the dual theory is that it does not properly handle the case in which the prospects of
consumptions of different natures are not perfect substitutes. The assumption of law invariance
of the decision functional (called neutrality in [24] and by which the decision maker is insensitive
to relabelings of the states of the world) is easier to substantiate when several dimensions of the
risk are considered in the decision functional.
To handle these situations, we need to be able to express utility derived from monetary con-
sumption in different numéraires, which is easily done with Expected Utility Theory, but so far
not covered by Yaari’s dual theory. Indeed, the latter applies only to risky prospects defined as
univariate random variables, thereby ruling out choice among multidimensional prospects which
are not perfect substitutes for each other, such as risks involving both a liquidity and a price
risk, collection of payments in different currencies, payments at different dates, prospects in-
volving different goods of different natures such as consumption and environmental quality, etc.
Yaari [23] proposes a multivariate version of his dual theory, but it involves independence of the
risk components and an axiom of separability (Axiom A in [23]), which essentially removes the
multidimensional nature of the problem.
We propose to remove this constraint with a multivariate extension of the dual theory to risky
prospects defined as random vectors that is applicable as such to the examples listed above. The
main challenge in this generalization is the definition of quantile functions and comonotonicity
in the multivariate setting. Another challenge is to preserve the simplicity of the functional rep-
resenting preferences, so that they can be parameterized and can be computed as efficiently as in
the univariate case. Both challenges are met with an appeal to optimal transportation maps that
allow for the definition of “generalized quantiles,” their efficient computation, and the extension
of comonotonicity as a notion of distribution free perfect correlation. There are many ways of ex-
tending the notion of comonotonicity to a multivariate framework consistently with the univariate
definition. Our proposed extension has the added property of preserving the equivalence between
comonotonicity and Pareto efficiency of allocations (see [10] for the original result and [4] for
the multivariate extension). With these notions of quantiles and comonotonicity in hand, we give
a representation of a comonotonic independent preference relation as a weighted sum of general-
ized quantiles. The main difference between the univariate case and the multivariate case is that
comonotonicity and generalized quantiles are defined with respect to an objective reference dis-
tribution, which features in the representation. The reference distribution is shown to be equal to
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maker.
We then turn to the representation of a risk averse decision makers’s preferences within this
theory. Risk aversion is defined in the usual way as a preference for less risky prospects, where the
notion of increasing risk is suitably generalized to multivariate risky prospects. We show, again
in a direct generalization of the univariate case, that risk aversion is characterized by a special
form of the quantile weights defined above: risk averse decision makers give more weight to low
outcomes (low quantiles) and less weight to high outcomes (high quantiles). As a result, given
the reference distribution with respect to which comonotonicity is defined, risk averse decision
makers are characterized by further simple restrictions on their utility functionals, which makes
this model as simple and as tractable as expected utility. A further advantage of our decision
functional is the simple characterization of the local utility function and its close relation to the
multivariate quantile function.
The risk averse Yaari decision functional is a version of the Weymark social evaluation
function (in [22]) with a continuous state space. Indeed, the formal equivalence between the
evaluation of risky prospects and the measurement of inequality noted in [2] and [9] allows us
to draw implications of our theory for the measurement of inequality of allocations of multiple
attributes, such as consumption, education, environment quality, etc. Seen as a social evaluation
function, our decision functional provides a compromise between the approach of [7] and [19] in
that it allows a flexible attitude to correlations between attributes without necessarily imposing
correlation aversion and thereby circumventing the Bourguignon–Chakravarty [3] critique of the
assumption that attributes are substitutes rather than complements.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a short exposition of the dual theory.
The following section develops the generalized notion of comonotonicity that is necessary for the
multivariate extension, which is given in Section 3. Risk aversion is characterized in Section 4.
The economic interpretation of the reference measure is given in Section 5 and the application to
multi-attribute inequality measurement is discussed in Section 6. The final section concludes.
Notation and basic definitions
Let (S,F ,P) be a non-atomic probability space. Let X :S → Rd be a random vector. We
denote the probability distribution of X by LX . E is the expectation operator with respect to P.
For x and y in Rd , let x · y be the standard scalar product of x and y, and ‖x‖2 the Euclidean
norm of x. We denote by X =d LX the fact that the distribution of X is LX and by X =d Y the
fact that X and Y have the same distribution. The equidistribution class of X =d LX , denoted
indifferently equi(LX) or equi(X), is the set of random vectors with distribution with respect to P
equal to LX (reference to P will be implicit unless stated otherwise). FX denotes the cumulative
distribution function of distribution LX . QX denotes its quantile function. In dimension 1, this is
defined for all t ∈ [0,1] by QX(t) = infx∈R{Pr(X  x) > t}. In larger dimensions, it is defined
in Definition 3 of Section 2.1 below. We call L2d the set of random vectors X in dimension d
such that E[‖X‖2] < +∞. We denote by D the subset of L2d containing random vectors with
a density relative to Lebesgue measure. A functional Φ on L2d is called upper semi-continuous
(denoted u.s.c.) if for any real number α, {X ∈ L2d : Φ(X) > α} is open. A functional Φ is lower
semi-continuous (l.s.c.) if −Φ is upper semi-continuous. For a convex lower semi-continuous
function V :Rd → R, we denote by ∇V its gradient (equal to the vector of partial derivatives).
A doubly stochastic matrix is a square matrix of nonnegative real numbers, each of whose rows
and columns sum to 1.
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In this section, we first revisit Yaari’s “Dual theory of choice under risk” presented in the
eponymous paper [24]. As in [24], we consider a problem of choice among risky prospects as
modeled by random variables defined on an underlying probability space. The risky prospect X
is interpreted as a gamble or a lottery that a decision maker might consider holding and the
realizations of X are interpreted as payments.
1.1. Representation
We suppose that the decision maker is characterized by a preference relation  on the set
of risky prospects. X  Y indicates that the decision maker prefers prospect X to prospect Y ,
X 	 Y stands for X  Y and not Y  X, whereas X ∼ Y stands for X  Y and Y  X. We
first introduce the set of axioms satisfied by the preference relation that were proposed by Yaari
in [24].
With the first axiom (which corresponds to Axioms A2 and A3 in Yaari [24]), we take the
standard notion of preference as a continuous pre-order (reflexive and transitive binary relation)
which is complete. Continuity of the preference relation is required relative to the topology of
weak convergence: a sequence of random prospects Xn converges weakly to X if Ef (Xn) con-
verges to Ef (X) for all continuous bounded functions f on Rd . Then,  can be represented by
a continuous real valued function γ in the sense that X  Y if and only if γ (X) γ (Y ).
Axiom 1. The preference relation  is reflexive, transitive, complete and continuous relative to
the topology of weak convergence.
A prospect X is said to first order stochastically dominate a prospect Y if there exist X˜ =d X
and Y˜ =d Y such that X(s) Y(s) for almost all states of the world s ∈ S. The following axiom
requires that whenever one prospect first order stochastically dominates a second, then the former
is preferred to the latter. This is formally stated as follows.
Axiom 2. The preference  preserves first order stochastic dominance in the sense that if
prospect X first order stochastically dominates prospect Y , then X  Y , and if X strictly first
order stochastically dominates prospect Y , then X 	 Y .
Two prospects with the same distribution first order stochastically dominate one another.
Hence, Axiom 2 implies law invariance of the preference relation, or what [24] calls neutral-
ity, i.e., X =d Y implies X ∼ Y . Neutrality can be interpreted as the fact that the decision maker
is indifferent to relabelings of the states of the world. Once neutrality is accepted, then Axiom 2
is reasonable as it is equivalent to requiring that the decision maker prefers prospects that yield
a higher value in every state of the world. We shall see below that with suitable extensions of
the concepts of monotonicity and stochastic dominance, this axiom remains reasonable in the
multivariate extension of Yaari’s representation theorem.
Finally, the third axiom is the crucial one in this framework, as it replaces independence by
comonotonic independence. Recall that X and Y are comonotonic if (X(s) − X(s′))(Y (s) −
Y(s′))  0 for all s, s′ ∈ S. The absence of a hedging opportunity between comonotonic
prospects justifies the requirement below.
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implies αX + (1 − α)Z  αY + (1 − α)Z.
We can now state Yaari’s representation result.
Proposition 1 (Yaari). A preference on [0,1]-valued prospects satisfies Axioms 1–3 if and only
if there exists a continuous non-decreasing function f defined on [0,1], such that X  Y if and
only if γ (X) γ (Y ), where γ is defined for all X as γ (X) = ∫ 10 f (1 − FX(t)) dt .
This result is interpretable in terms of weighting of outcomes (through the weighting of quan-
tiles). Assume that each of the functions that we consider satisfy the invertibility and regularity










f (1 − u)dQX(u) =
1∫
0






f ′(1 − u)QX(u)du.
Hence, calling φ(u) = f ′(1 − u), we have the representation of  with the functional∫ 1
0 φ(t)QX(t) dt . Hence, increasing f corresponds to positive φ, which can be interpreted as
a weighting of the quantiles of the prospect X. As noted in [24], the functional γ satisfies
γ (γ (X)) = γ (X), so that γ (X) is the certainty equivalent of X for the decision maker charac-
terized by .
1.2. Risk aversion
We now turn to the characterization of risk averse decision makers among those satisfying
Axioms 1–3. We define increasing risk as in Rothschild and Stiglitz [14]. The formulations in
the first part of the definition below are equivalent by the Blackwell–Sherman–Stein Theorem
(see, for instance, Chapter 7 of [16]).
Definition 1 (Concave ordering, risk aversion).
(a) A prospect Y is dominated by X in the concave ordering, denoted Y cv X, when the equiv-
alent statements (i) or (ii) hold:
(i) for all continuous concave functions, Ef (Y ) Ef (X);
(ii) Y has the same distribution as Yˆ where (X, Yˆ ) is a martingale, i.e., E(Yˆ |X) = X (Yˆ is
sometimes called a mean-preserving spread of X).
(b) The preference relation  is called risk averse if X  Y whenever X cv Y .
Notice that x → x and x → −x are both continuous and concave function. Therefore, con-
dition (i) in the first part of the definition implies that E[X] = E[Y ] is necessary for a concave
ordering relationship between X and Y to exist. With this definition, we can recall the character-
ization of risk averse preferences satisfying Axioms 1–3 as those with convex f (see Section 5
of [24] or Theorem 3.A.7 of [16]).
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function f in Theorem 1 is convex.
This monotonicity of the derivative of f has the natural interpretation that risk averse de-
cision makers evaluate prospects by giving high weights to low quantiles (corresponding to
low values of the prospect) and low weights to high quantiles. Indeed, with the formulation
γ (X) = ∫ 10 φ(u)QX(u)du and the identification φ(u) = f ′(1 − u), an increasing convex f cor-
responds to positive decreasing φ, and therefore to a weighting scheme in which low quantiles
(corresponding to unfavorable outcomes) receive high weights and high quantiles (corresponding
to favorable outcomes) receive low weights.
2. Multivariate quantiles and comonotonicity
The main ingredients in our multivariate representation theorem are the multivariate exten-
sions of quantiles and comonotonicity. As we shall see, the two are intimately related.
2.1. Multivariate quantiles
We first note that the quantile of a random variable can be characterized as an increasing re-
arrangement of the latter. Hence, by classical rearrangement inequalities, quantiles are solutions
to maximum correlation problems. More precisely, by the rearrangement inequality of Hardy,
Littlewood and Pólya [8], we have the following well-known equality:
1∫
0
tQX(t) d(t) = max
{
E[XU ]: U uniformly distributed on [0,1]}, (2.1)
where the quantile function QX has been defined above. This variational characterization is
crucial when generalizing Yaari’s representation theorem to the multivariate setting. Indeed, con-
sider now a random vector X on Rd and a reference distribution μ on Rd , with U distributed
according to μ. We introduce maximum correlation functionals to generalize the variational for-
mulation of (2.1).
Definition 2 (Maximal correlation functionals). A functional μ :L2d → R is called a maximal
correlation functional with respect to a reference distribution μ if for all X ∈ L2d ,
μ(X) := sup
{
E[X · U˜ ]: U˜ =d μ
}
.
It follows from the theory of optimal transportation (see Theorem 2.12(ii), p. 66 of [20])
that if μ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure (which will be assumed
throughout the rest of the paper), then there exists a convex lower semi-continuous function
V :Rd → R and a random vector U distributed according to μ such that X = ∇V (U) holds
μ-almost surely, and such that μ(X) = E[∇V (U) · U ]. In that case, the pair (U,X) is said to
achieve the optimal quadratic coupling of μ with respect to the distribution of X. The function V
is called the transportation potential of X with respect to μ or the transportation potential from μ
to the probability distribution of X.1 This shows that the gradient of the convex function V thus
1 V is convex and hence differentiable except on set of measure zero by Rademacher’s Theorem (Theorem 2.4 in [13]),
so that the expression E[∇V (U) · U ] above is well defined.
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a generalized quantile.
Definition 3 (μ-quantile). The μ-quantile function of a random vector X on Rd with respect to
an absolutely continuous distribution μ on Rd is defined by QX = ∇V , where V is the trans-
portation potential of X with respect to μ.
This concept of a multivariate quantile is the counterpart of our definition of multivariate
comonotonicity in the representation theorem, and the latter, introduced in the following section
has strong economic underpinnings, as discussed in Section 5, where we give the economic
interpretation of the reference measure μ.
2.2. Multivariate comonotonicity
Two univariate prospects X and Y are comonotonic if there is a prospect U and non-
decreasing maps TX and TY such that Y = TY (U) and X = TX(U) almost surely or, equivalently,
E[UX] = max{E[U˜X]: U˜ =d U} and E[UY ] = max{E[U˜Y ]: U˜ =d U}. Comonotonicity is
hence characterized by maximal correlation between the prospects over the equidistribution class.
This variational characterization (where products will be replaced by scalar products) will be the
basis for our generalized notion of comonotonicity.
Definition 4 (μ-comonotonicity). Let μ be a probability measure on Rd with finite second mo-










When μ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, it follows from the rep-
resentation of μ that the family Xi is μ-comonotonic if and only if there exists a vector U
distributed according to μ such that U ∈ argmax
U˜
{E[Xi · U˜ ], U˜ =d μ} for all i ∈ I . In other
words, the Xi ’s can be rearranged simultaneously so that they achieve maximal correlation
with U . When the distributions of the random vectors are absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesgue measure, the concept of μ-comonotonicity is transitive.
Proposition 3. Suppose that X and Y are μ-comonotonic and that Y and Z are μ-comonotonic,
with the distribution of Y assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
Then X and Z are μ-comonotonic.
Comonotonic allocations and Pareto efficiency It is worth discussing this definition of comono-
tonicity as generalizations of the classical univariate notion of comonotonicity are not unique.
The main motivation for introducing it is to generalize the univariate equivalence between
comonotonic and Pareto efficient allocations in a risk-sharing economy. Consider an Arrow–
Debreu economy with n agents, and with an aggregate endowment which is a random vector X.
Thus the i-th dimension of the realization Xi(ω) in state ω ∈ Ω of this random vector is the quan-
tity of good i ∈ {1, . . . , d} produced in this state. An allocation (or risk-sharing allocation) of X
is a sharing rule of this aggregate endowment among the n agents, hence it is the specification of
n random vectors X1, . . . ,Xn such that




where Xik(ω) is the quantity of good i allocated to agent k ∈ {1, . . . , n} in state ω. An allocation
is called (Pareto) efficient if no other allocation dominates the former, agent by agent, in the sense
of the concave ordering (as defined in Proposition 4 below).
In dimension one, it is known since the seminal paper of Landsberger and Meilijson [10] that
a risk-sharing allocation is Pareto efficient with respect to the concave order if and only if it is
comonotonic. That is, given any comonotonic allocation, it is not possible to find another alloca-
tion such that each risky endowment would be preferred under the new allocation by every risk
averse decision maker to the endowments in the original allocation. Multivariate generalization
of this equivalence is not obvious, but it turns out that, as recently shown by Carlier, Dana and
Galichon [4], this result can be extended to the multivariate case, with comonotonicity replaced
by multivariate comonotonicity, if one defines an allocation to be comonotonic in the multivari-
ate sense if and only if it is μ-comonotonic for some measure μ with enough regularity. In our
view, this result strongly supports the claim that our notion of comonotonicity is in some sense
the “natural” multivariate extension of comonotonicity.
Relation with other multivariate notions of comonotonicity Puccetti and Scarsini [12] have
also applied the theory of optimal transportation to generalize the notion of comonotonicity to
the multivariate setting. They review possible multivariate extensions of comonotonicity, includ-
ing the notion of μ-comonotonicity that we propose. But the concept they favor differs from
ours in the sense that according to their notion of multivariate comonotonicity (which they
call c-comonotonicity), two vectors X and Y are c-comonotonic if and only if (X,Y ) is an
optimal quadratic coupling. That is, X and Y are c-comonotonic if and only if there is a con-
vex function V such that Y = ∇V (X) holds almost surely. However, unlike μ-comonotonicity,
c-comonotonicity is in general not transitive, and does not seem to be related to efficient risk-
sharing allocations and equilibrium.
Schmeidler [15] introduces an internal notion of comonotonicity: if a decision maker evaluates
prospects according to, then Schmeidler-comonotonicity of two prospects X and Y means that
for all pairs of states of the world (s, t), X(s)X(t) implies Y(s) Y(t), i.e., prospects X and Y
are more desirable in the same states of the world. In contrast, we extend the Weymark [22] –
Yaari [24] motivation in our definition of comonotonicity, which can be related to the state prices
in the economy, as explained in Section 5. The two notions have no obvious relation, as we see by
considering two μ-comonotonic prospects X and Y and imposing Schmeidler-comonotonicity.
By μ-comonotonicity, there exists U =d μ and generalized quantile functions QX and QY such
that X = QX(U) and Y = QY (U). Schmeidler-comonotonicity of X and Y would require that
the univariate random variables (EU) · X and (EU) · Y are comonotonic in the usual sense. Al-
though they are equivalent in dimension one, in higher dimensions, neither of these two concepts
implies the other.
3. Multivariate representation theorem
Now that we have given a formalization of the notion of maximal correlation in a law invari-
ant sense that is suitable for a multivariate extension of Yaari’s dual theory, we can proceed to
generalize Yaari’s representation result to the case of a preference relation among multivari-
ate prospects. We consider prospects, which are elements of L2 . Axiom 1′ below is a mildd
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tiable in X relative to the L2d metric if there is a linear functional L such that |γ (X + h) −
γ (X) − L(h)|/
√
E[h2] → 0. As in [5], the functional will not be Fréchet differentiable at all
points; we only require differentiability at one point.
Axiom 1′. The preference  is represented by a continuous functional γ on L2d such that at least
one point its Fréchet derivative exists and is non-zero.
Given sufficient regularity, first order stochastic dominance can be characterized equivalently
by pointwise dominance of cumulative distribution functions or pointwise dominance of quantile
functions. It is the latter that we adopt for our multivariate definition.
Definition 5 (μ-first order stochastic dominance). A prospect X μ-first order stochastically dom-
inates prospect Y relative to the componentwise partial order  on Rd if QX(t)  QY (t) for
almost all t ∈ Rd , where QX and QY are the generalized quantiles of X and Y with respect to a
distribution μ on Rd .
For any U =d μ, we have QX(U) =d X and QY (U) =d Y . If X μ-first order stochasti-
cally dominates Y , then QX(U)QY (U) almost surely. Hence, Xˆ  Yˆ almost surely for some
Xˆ =d X and Yˆ =d Y , which is the “usual multivariate stochastic order” (see [16, p. 266]). The
converse does not hold in general.
The remaining two axioms require fixing an absolutely continuous reference probability dis-
tribution μ on Rd .
Axiom 2′. The preference  preserves μ-first order stochastic dominance in the sense that if
prospect X μ-first order stochastically dominates prospect Y , then X  Y , and if X μ-first order
strictly stochastically dominates prospect Y , then X 	 Y .
The extension of the comonotonicity axiom is the key to the generalization of the dual
theory to multivariate prospects. The statement of Axiom 3 is unchanged, but the concept of
comonotonicity is now dependent on a reference distribution μ. The prospects X, Y and Z are
comonotonic, or more precisely μ-comonotonic, if they are all maximally correlated in the law
invariant sense of Definition 4 with a reference U (where U has distribution μ).
Axiom 3′. If X, Y and Z are μ-comonotonic prospects, then for any α ∈ [0,1], X  Y implies
αX + (1 − α)Z  αY + (1 − α)Z.
We are now in a position to state the multivariate extension of Yaari’s representation theorem.
Theorem 1 (Multivariate representation). A preference relation on multivariate prospects in L2d
satisfies Axioms 1′, 2′ and 3′ relative to a reference probability measure μ if and only if there
exists a function φ such that for U =d μ, φ(U) ∈ L2d , φ(U) ∈ (R−)d almost surely and such
that for all pairs X, Y , X  Y if and only if γ (X)  γ (Y ), where γ is defined for all X by
γ (X) = E[QX(U) · φ(U)], where QX is the μ-quantile of X.
When d = 1, the representation is independent of μ and we recover the result of Proposition 1.
As in the univariate case, the decision maker assesses prospects with a weighting scheme φ of
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certainty equivalent of X as in the univariate case. Furthermore,  satisfies linearity in pay-
ments, i.e., for any positive real number a and any b ∈ Rd (identified with a constant multivariate
prospect), γ (aX + b) = aγ (X) + b.
It should be noted that Choquet expected utility [15] handles multivariate prospects under
Schmeidler-comonotonicity (defined in Section 2.2). As shown in [21], under Axiom 2, Choquet
expected utility is identical to the functional of Proposition 1. Hence, when restricted to decision
under risk, Choquet expected utility aggregates the multiple dimensions of the prospects with
the utility function and then considers univariate quantiles of the resulting utility index. This is
in contrast with the functional of Theorem 1, which directly evaluates multivariate quantiles of
the prospects and thereby models attitudes to substitution risk between the dimensions of the
prospect.
4. Risk aversion and the local utility function
In this section, we consider the question of representing those decision makers satisfying
Axioms 1′, 2′ and 3′ that are risk averse in the sense of Definition 1. We then show that the local
utility function in the sense of [11] is easily computable and provides an interpretation of the
reference distribution μ.
4.1. Risk aversion
For our characterization of risk averse Yaari decision makers, we need to generalize the con-
cept of a mean-preserving spread to the multivariate setting.
Proposition 4 (Concave ordering). For any prospects X and Y whose respective distributions are
absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, the following properties are equivalent:
(a) For every bounded concave function f on Rd , Ef (X) Ef (Y ).
(b) Y =d Yˆ , with E[Yˆ |X] = X.
(c) μ(X) μ(Y ) for every probability measure μ.
(d) X belongs to the closure of the convex hull of the equidistribution class of Y .
(e) Φ(X)Φ(Y) for every u.s.c. law invariant concave functional Φ :L2d → R.
When any of the properties above hold, one says that Y is dominated by X in the concave
ordering, denoted Y cv X.
Statements (a) and (b) are identical in the multivariate case as in [14]. The equivalence be-
tween the two is a classical result that can be traced back at least to [17] (see Appendix A.2
for details). The interpretation of the ordering as a preference ordering for all risk aversion ex-
pected utility maximizers (a) and as an ordering of mean-preserving spreads (b) also carry over
to the multivariate case. Statement (d) is the continuous equivalent to multiplication by a doubly
stochastic matrix.
As in the univariate case and Definition 1(b), risk averse decision makers will be defined by
aversion to mean-preserving spreads. It turns out that imposing risk aversion on a preference
relation that satisfies Axioms 1′, 2′ and 3′ is equivalent to requiring the following property,
sometimes called preference for diversification.
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combinations are preferred to either of the prospects (i.e., for any α ∈ [0,1], αX+(1−α)Y X).
This is formalized in the following theorem, which gives a representation for risk averse Yaari
decision makers.
Theorem 2. In dimension d  2, for a preference relation satisfying Axioms 1′, 2′ and 3′, the
following statements are equivalent:
(a)  is risk averse, namely X  Y whenever X cv Y .
(b)  satisfies Axiom 4.
(c) The function φ involved in the representation of the preference relation in Theorem 1 satisfies
−φ(u) = αu + u0 for α > 0 and u0 ∈ Rd .
So, in the multivariate setting the functional γ is convex if and only if φ(x) = −αx − x0
for some α real positive and x0 ∈ Rd . This is a major difference with dimension one, where the
functional is convex if and only if −φ is a non-decreasing map. This implies that a multivariate
Yaari risk averse decision maker is entirely characterized by the reference distribution μ.
4.2. Local utility function
Throughout the rest of the paper, we shall assume that the conditions in Theorem 2 are met.
Hence, our discussion of local utility functions will be limited to the case of risk averse decision
makers. By law invariance, we denote γ (P ) := γ (X), where X =d P . Without loss of generality,
we shall also assume that φ(u) = −u, thus γ (P ) := −E[∇VP (U) · U ], where VP = VX is the
transportation potential (see Section 2.1 for the definition) from the reference probability distri-
bution μ of U to the probability distribution P of X. As we have seen, the gradient ∇VP of this
transportation potential is the μ-quantile function of distribution P .
As shown in [11], when smoothness requirements are met, a local analysis can be carried
out in which a (risk averse) non-expected utility function behaves for small perturbations around
a fixed risk in that same way as a (concave) utility function. Formally, the local utility function
is defined as u(x|P) = DPγ (x), where DPγ is the Fréchet derivative of γ at P (see Section 3
for the definition). Denoting by V ∗(x) = supu[u · x − V (u)] the Legendre–Fenchel transform of
a convex lower semi-continuous function V , we have











V ∗P (x) dP (x)
by the duality of optimal transportation (see, for instance, Theorem 2.9, p. 60 of [20]).
Defining f (V,Q) = ∫ V dμ + ∫ V ∗ dQ, we have γ (P ) = − infV f (V,P ). Hence, an en-
velope theorem argument formally yields u(x|P) = DPγ (x) = −V ∗P (x). Therefore, the local
utility function is −V ∗P , the (negative of the) Legendre–Fenchel transform of the transportation
potential VP . This point sheds light on the economic interpretation of this potential, thanks to
Machina’s theory of local utility. The function −V ∗ is concave, which is consistent with the riskP
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u(x|P) = −V ∗P (x) =
∫ x
−∞ FX(z) dz, so that we recover the fact that when X =d P is a mean-
preserving spread of Y =d Q, u(z|P) u(z|Q) for all z.
5. Economic interpretation of the reference measure
We now discuss the behavioral interpretation of μ. As we saw in Theorem 1, the generaliza-
tion of the Yaari preferences to the multivariate case led us to define a utility functional γ over
prospects such that γ (X) = E[X · φ(U˜)] for some prospect U˜ which is correlated to X. U˜ is an
index such that X · U˜ measures how favorable the outcome is for the decision maker. φ(U˜) is
a weighting of the contingent outcome X, so that γ over- or under-weights prospects in each state
using weights φ(U˜). Hence, the dispersion of μ induces a departure from risk-neutrality. In the
special case in which μ is the distribution of a constant u0, γ (X) = E[X ·φ(u0)] = E[X] ·φ(u0)
and one recovers the case of a risk-neutral decision maker. On the contrary, when μ exhibits
considerable dispersion, then the variance of φ(U˜) is large in general, so that the “favorable”
outcomes (in the sense that X · U˜ is high) are weighted less, at least if φ(U˜) = −αU˜ . This in-
duces risk aversion. When φ(U˜) differs from a rescaling of U˜ , there may be some discrepancy
between the weighting of a given state and how favorable it is. Hence, the variance of μ is no
longer directly associated with risk aversion.
We now turn to the equilibrium implications of the reference measure μ and show how it is
related to the distribution of the state prices in an economy in equilibrium when a decision maker
with risk averse decision functional as in Theorem 2 is present in the economy. Consider an econ-
omy where one of the agents (whom we shall refer to as “Yaari”) has preferences as in Theorem 2,
with reference measure μ. Assume that there is a risk-sharing equilibrium in this economy, which
is supported by the stochastic discount factor ξ , meaning that if the original risky endowment of
the agent is X0, then the agent’s budget set is {X: E[(X−X0) ·ξ ] = 0}. The demand for risk X of
Yaari is therefore max
Xˆ
γ (Xˆ) subject to E[(Xˆ−X0) · ξ ] = 0. Since Yaari is assumed risk averse,
γ is concave, and the demand for risk X satisfies the local optimality condition max
Xˆ
E[u(Xˆ|P)]
subject to E[(Xˆ − X0) · ξ ] = 0. The first order conditions yield ∇u(X|P) = λξ , where λ is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, where λ = 0 unless there is no trade in
equilibrium. Now, as explained above, u(x|P) = −V ∗P (x), hence ∇u(X|P) = −∇V ∗P (X). Now,
by definition of the transportation potential Vp from μ to P , ∇V ∗P (X) =d μ. Hence −λξ =d μ
which implies that μ is (up to scale) the distribution of the stochastic discount factor ξ . Therefore,
when there is a Yaari decision maker with reference measure μ in the economy, the stochastic
discount factor should be distributed according to μ. This result is an extension of the well-
known result that states that when there is a risk-neutral decision maker in the economy, the
stochastic discount factor should equal one, that is, the risk-neutral probability should coincide
with the actuarial probability. To summarize, if a risk-sharing equilibrium exists with a Yaari risk
averse decision maker with reference measure μ, then μ coincides with the distribution of the
stochastic discount factor. Thereby, μ is related to the distribution of the state prices.
6. Relation with multi-attribute inequality measurement
The theory developed here has implications for inequality rankings of allocations of multiple
attributes (such as income, education, environmental quality, etc.) in a population. Atkinson [2]
recognized the relevance of stochastic orderings to the measurement of inequality and its founda-
tion on principles such as the desirability of Pigou–Dalton transfers (also known as Pigou–Dalton
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independence, which he interpreted as neutrality to the source of variation in income, and ob-
tained a class of social evaluation functions, which he called generalized Gini evaluation func-
tions. The functional form is identical to the decision functional derived independently on a
continuous state space by [24]. Indeed, [9] notes the formal equivalence between the problem of
decision under risk and the measurement of inequality. The random vector of risks or prospects
that we consider in the present work can be interpreted as an allocation of multiple attributes over
a continuum of individuals. With this interpretation, states of the world are identified with indi-
viduals in the population and the decision function γ is interpreted as a social evaluation function.
Law invariance (Yaari neutrality, i.e., insensitivity to relabelings of the states of the world) of the
decision functional is thus equivalent to anonymity of the social evaluation function. The ranking
of ordinally equivalent allocations obtained through Pigou–Dalton Majorization (see [9]) corre-
sponds to the concave ordering discussed in Proposition 4. More precisely, the mean-preserving
spread characterization (b) in Proposition 4 is equivalent to (d), which is the infinite-dimensional
analogue of multiplication by a doubly stochastic matrix. Hence, our risk averse multivariate
Yaari decision functional can be interpreted as a social evaluation function for allocations of
multiple attributes, which satisfies anonymity, monotonicity and Pigou–Dalton Majorization in
the sense of Theorem 3 in [9].
The inequality literature achieves functional forms for social evaluation functions in the multi-
attribute case by adding two distinct types of majorization principles that allow the comparison
of non-ordinally equivalent social evaluations. Tsui [18,19] considers correlation increasing
transfers. Gajdos and Weymark [7] extend generalized Gini social evaluation functions to the
multivariate case with a comonotonic independence axiom. Two allocations are said to be
comonotonic if all individuals are ranked identically in all attributes (i.e., the richest is also
the most educated, etc.), and the ranking between two comonotonic allocations is not reversed
by the addition of a comonotonic allocation. They use an attribute separability axiom (Axiom A
in [23]) to reduce the dimensionality of the problem via independence of the attributes. Specif-
ically, Theorem 4 of [7] is a special case of our Theorem 2 when the attribute vector X and the
reference distribution μ both have independent marginals. Our representation can also incorpo-
rate trade-offs between attributes and attitudes to correlations between attributes of the kind that
are entertained in [19], but is not restricted to the latter. Correlation aversion would correspond
to perceived substitutability, but perceived complementarity can also be entertained in our ap-
proach, thereby circumventing Bourguignon and Chakravarty’s critique of correlation increasing
majorization (in [3]) based on the observation that “there is no a priori reason for a person to
regard attributes as substitutes only. Some of the attributes can as well be complements” (p. 36).
7. Conclusion
We have developed concepts of quantiles and comonotonicity for multivariate prospects, thus
allowing for the consideration of choice among vectors of payments in different currencies, at
different times, in different categories of goods, etc. The multivariate concepts of quantiles and
comonotonicity were used to generalize Yaari’s dual theory of choice under risk, where decision
makers that are insensitive to hedging of comonotonic risks are shown to evaluate prospects
using a weighted sum of quantiles. Risk averse decision makers were shown to be characterized
within this framework by a reference distribution, making the dual theory as readily applicable
as expected utility. Risk attitudes were also analyzed from the point of view of a local utility
function. Implications for the ranking of increasing risk aversion is the topic of further research.
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also discussed. The flexibility in its handling of attitudes to correlation between attributes is a
promising feature of the decision functional.
Appendix A. Proofs of results in the main text
A.1. Proof of Proposition 3
By definition, there are two convex lower semi-continuous functions V1 and V2 and a random
vector U =d μ such that X = ∇V1(U) and Y = ∇V2(U) almost surely. Similarly, there are
convex functions V3 and V4 and a random vector U˜ such that Y = ∇V3(U˜) and Z = ∇V4(U˜ ).
Now the assumptions on the absolute continuity of μ and the distribution of Y imply that ∇V2
is essentially unique. Hence, ∇V2 = ∇V3 and, therefore, U = U˜ holds almost surely. It follows
that X and Z are μ-comonotonic. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 4
The equivalence between (a) and (b) is a famous result stated and extended by many authors,
notably Hardy, Littlewood, Pólya, Blackwell, Stein, Sherman, Cartier, Fell, Meyer and Strassen.
See Theorem 2 of [17] for an elegant proof. We now show that (b) implies (c). Suppose (b)
holds. As explained in Section 2.1, there exists a map ζ such that μ(X) = E[ζ(X) · X] and
ζ(X) =d μ. Now, E[ζ(X) · X] = E[ζ(X) · E[Yˆ |X]] = E[ζ(X) · Yˆ ], which is less than μ(Y ).
Next, we show that (c) implies (d). Indeed, the convex closure co(equi(Y )) of the equidistribu-
tion class of Y is a closed convex set and hence characterized by its support functional μ(Y ).
Therefore, X ∈ co(equi(Y )) is equivalent to E[Z · X] μ(Y ) for all Z, which in turn is equiv-
alent to μ(X)  μ(Y ). Now, we show that (d) implies (e). Indeed, if X ∈ co(equi(Y )), then









k . Then, for any law invariant concave func-








k ) = Φ(Y) and the conclusion follows by upper
semi-continuity. Finally, (e) implies (a) because when LX is absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesgue measure, for any bounded concave function f , X → Ef (X) is a law invariant con-
cave upper semi-continuous functional. 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 1
Note first that γ defined for all prospects X by γ (X) = E[QX(U) · φ(U)] for a function φ
such that φ(U) ∈ (R−)d is Lipschitz and monotonic, so that Axioms 1′ and 2′ are satisfied
for a preference relation represented by γ . Finally, comonotonic independence follows directly
from the fact that for any two prospects X and Y , the generalized quantile functions QX , QY
and QX+Y satisfy QX+Y (U) = QX(U) + QY (U). We now show this fact. By the definition
of the generalized quantile functions, we have E[QX+Y (U) · U ] = supU˜=dU E[(X + Y) · U˜ ] 
sup
U˜=dU E[X · U˜ ] + supU˜=dU E[Y · U˜ ] = E[QX(U) · U ] + E[QY (U) · U ]. On the other hand,
we also have E[QX+Y (U) · U ] = supZ˜=dX+Y E[Z˜ · U ]  E[(QX(U) + QY (U)) · U ] since by
construction, QX(U) =d X and QY (U) =d Y , and the desired equality follows.
Conversely, we now prove that a preference relation  satisfying Axioms 1′, 2′ and 3′ is
represented by a functional γ defined for all prospect X by γ (X) = E[QX(U) · φ(U)] for a
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representing  and there is a point Z ∈ L2d , where γ is Fréchet differentiable with non-zero
gradient D. Let QZ be the generalized quantile of Z relative to μ. There exists a U ∈ L2d
with distribution μ such that Z = QZ(U) almost surely. Let X and Y be two prospects in Ldd
with μ-quantile functions QX and QY respectively. By the definition of μ-comonotonicity,
QX(U), QY (U) and Z = QZ(U) are μ-comonotonic. By Axiom 2′, γ is law invariant, so that
γ (X) γ (Y ) is equivalent to γ (QX(U)) γ (QY (U)). Hence, by Axiom 3′, γ (X) γ (Y ) im-
plies that for any 0 <   1, we have γ (QX(U)+ (1 − )Z) γ (QY (U)+ (1 − )Z). Hence,
γ (Z+(QX(U)−Z)) γ (Z+(QY (U)−Z)) and, therefore, γ (Z)+E[D ·(QX(U)−Z)]
γ (Z) + E[D · (QY (U) − Z)] − o(), or, finally, E[D · QX(U)] E[D · QY (U)].
Suppose now that X and Y are two prospects such that E[D · QX(U)] = E[D · QY (U)].
We shall show that γ (QX(U)) = γ (QY (U)) and, hence, that γ (X) = γ (Y ), thereby concluding
that the functional X → E[D · QX(U)] represents . Indeed, suppose that E[D · QX(U)] =
E[D · QY (U)]. We will show shortly that there exists a function φ such that E[D · ∇φ(U)] > 0
and, hence, that E[D · (QX(U)+ ∇φ(U))] > E[D ·QY (U)] and E[D · (QX(U)− ∇φ(U))] <
E[D ·QY (U)] for any  > 0. Using the result above yields γ (QX(U) + ∇φ(U)) γ (QY (U))
and γ (QX(U) − ∇φ(U))  γ (QY (U)). Hence, γ (QX(U)) = γ (QY (U)) by the continuity
of γ . Let us now show that E[D · ∇φ(U)] = 0 for all gradient functions ∇φ yields a con-
tradiction. Calling VZ the convex function such that Z = QZ(U) = ∇VZ(U) almost surely,
D is the Fréchet derivative of γ at Z = ∇VZ(U). Hence, E[D · ∇φ(U)] = 0 implies that
γ (∇(VZ(U) + φ(U))) = γ (∇VZ(U)) + o(). This is true for all gradient functions ∇φ and,
in particular, for φ = (V − VZ)/, where V is such that Z = ∇V(U) converges to Z in L2.
We then have γ (Z) − γ (Z) = o() and, hence, D = 0, which contradicts Axiom 1′. We have
shown that is represented by the functional X → E[D ·QX(U)]. As μ is absolutely continuous
with respect to Lebesgue measure, D can be written as φ(U) for some function φ which takes
values in (R−)d by Axiom 2′. 
A.4. Proof of Theorem 2
That (a) implies (b) follows from Proposition 4. We now show that (b) implies (c). Axiom 4
implies that γ (QX +α(X˜−QX)) γ (X) for all α ∈ (0,1] and all X˜ in the equidistribution class
of X. The representation of Theorem 1 implies the differentiability of γ at QX(U) for any X, call
DX its gradient. This implies that E[X˜ ·DX] E[QX(U) ·DX] for all X˜ =d X. Hence, γ (X) =
−Lφ(U)(X). Thus, by Axiom 3′, comonotonicity with respect to μ implies comonotonicity with
respect to Lφ(U). By Lemma 10 in [6], this implies that φ(U) = −αU − x0 for some α > 0 and
x0 ∈ Rd , and the result follows. Finally, we show that (c) implies (a). Assume (c), in which case
for all X ∈ L2d , −γ (X) = αE[QX(U) · U ] + u0 · E[X]. Thus, −γ (X) = αμ(X) + u0 · E[X].
Therefore, by Proposition 4, X cv Y implies μ(X) μ(Y ), and so γ (X) γ (Y ). 
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